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Abstract 
This paper assumes a Ricardian Economy and analyzes migration of illegal unskilled 
workers in a model of Cournot Duopoly where firms are producing homogenous 
and non-traded goods, and hiring illegal immigrants. The focus is on the behaviours 
of firms and the implications for the output, prices and employment of domestic 
workers in that industry. A two-stage simultaneous move game is set up: In Stage 1, 
for a given technology and vigilance level, each individual firm will decide whether to 
hire illegal immigrants. In Stage 2, each firm will choose the Cournot output level. 
Using this structure, we provide additional insights as to why firms hire illegal work-
ers and what motivates these firms in their hiring practices. Furthermore the pres-
ence of illegal immigrants may create more employment for domestic workers and a 
social planner can be strategic in choosing optimal level of vigilance as we have 
shown that multiple solutions for optimal vigilance are possible and also Pareto 
ranked. 
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1. Introduction 
Illegal migrants are present in almost every developed as well as several underdeveloped 
countries. Examples include Canada, the European Union, India, Japan, South Africa 
and the USA. For example, in the United States, combined evidence from various 
sources suggests that there were at least 7 million unauthorized migrants at the time of 
the 2000 census, out of a total of 31 million foreign-born people in the country, who 
were not US citizens at the time of their birth. Of the unauthorized, an estimated 4.8 
million were Mexican? [1]1. A more recent figure has confirmed that the total estimated 
number of illegal immigrants in the US has increased to 12 million [2]. 
 
 
1It can also be a very divisive issue in many countries as recent examples in France, UK and the USA show. 
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2 
Although the issue of whether illegal migrants enhance the welfare of a host country 
is debatable, most countries have adopted policies to halt the flow of illegal immigration 
[3] [4] [5]. Two common policies, which are used by most countries to halt the flow of 
illegal migrants, are (i) internal enforcement such as imposing sanctions on employers 
who hire illegal migrants that includes-a demand-side policy, and (ii) border enforce- 
ment-a supply-side policy. Note that the supply side immigration policy could also be 
influenced by the immigrant’s self-selection mechanism [6]. 
Both of the above policies, employer sanction and border enforcement, along with 
the effects of illegal immigration have been extensively analyzed in the international 
trade literature [7] [8] [9] [10]. These analyses have generally taken place utilising 
perfectly competitive general equilibrium (hereafter GE) frameworks. 
However, many industries that hire illegal migrants are operating under an oligopoly 
market structure. For example, The US meat-packer industry which predominantly 
hires illegal migrants operates under an oligopoly market structure where strategic 
interaction plays a crucial role [11]. The problem is so severe that one of the kosher 
meat-packing companies in Iowa, which had been charged for hiring illegal immigrants, 
and was fined so heavily that it filed for bankruptcy [12]. Recent evidence, as argued by 
Porter (2006), suggests that even though the US has declared an all-out war against 
illegal immigration by increasing the border enforcement budget, a closer examination 
reveals that the deterrent effect of the designed policy is small [13] [14]2. Porter (2006) 
has argued that one of the main reasons for the continued ineffectiveness of the illegal 
immigration policy (policing) is that the work-place is virtually unpoliced3. This is due, 
in part, to political pressure not to police the work-place as it hurts employers. 
Therefore, to analyze such industries, one needs to utilize a partial equilibrium 
framework. Despite the limitation of such a framework (compared to GE), it may 
provide more insights into the behaviour of an individual firm that operates under an 
oligopoly market structure and hires illegal migrants. This also plays a crucial role in 
the design and implementation of the demand-side policy of employer sanction in such 
a market structure. Thus our focus is on the role of vigilance and employer sanctions 
rather than the relative effectiveness of boarder enforcement versus employer sanctions. 
Our paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides the basic model set-up, Section 
3 analyses welfare and determines the optimal vigilance level and Section 4 concludes. 
2. Model  
Preliminaries  
We utilise the same set-up as Nabin and Sgro (2013) and their Lemma 1 below and 
Lemma 2 in the next section 3.1 for our analysis. There are two firms, 1  and 2 , 
operating in a Ricardian Economy where the only means of production is unskilled 
labour4. Each individual firm is producing non-traded homogenous goods iq , where 
 
 
2[15] argues that illegal immigrants can also reduce their chances of being caught by hiring smugglers, who 
are often called coyotes. 
3On the other hand, internal enforcement has proven very effective in northern European countries such as 
Germany and the Netherlands [16]. 
4We are considering a very simple production structure. Other factors of production such as capital, could be 
added but will unnecessarily complicate the model. 
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{ }1, 2i = . The market demand function is ( )P Q A Q= −  where Q  is the total 
amount of output (i.e. 2 1 iiQ q== ∑ ) produced by the two firms. An individual firm will 
maximize the following objective function:  
( )max i iqi
P Q c qΠ = −                          (1) 
Here, 0ic >  is the cost of producing one unit of output. Assume that, for given 
technology T , an individual firm i  needs Tˆl  labour (assuming that ˆ0 1Tl≤ ≤ ) in 
order to produce one unit of output iq  i.e. labour demand to produce one unit of 
output is Tˆl . We assume linear production technology where the labour demand for 
unit output is fixed for a given technology T 5. 
The unskilled labour market consists of both domestic denoted by d  and illegal 
immigrant workers, per unit of output denoted by h . It is also assumed that unskilled 
labour market is characterized by surplus labour and a binding minimum wage is in 
operation. 
Each firm i  has to pay the minimum wage 0w >  per unit of domestic worker d . 
Therefore, the cost of hiring a domestic worker by an individual firm i  to produce 
one unit of output, denoted by dic , is as follows:  
d
ic w=                                (2) 
Alternatively, each individual firm can hire illegal migrants. The cost of hiring an 
illegal migrant h  depends on: (i) the minimum wage, denoted by wθ , paid to illegal 
migrant where the parameter ( ]0,1θ ∈ . Without loss of generality, we assume that θ  
is given6. In the absence of vigilance and employer sanction, for any θ  such that 
1θ < , Tˆh l=  and an individual firm has an incentive to hire illegal immigrants only. 
However, in the case where both vigilance and employer sanction are present, Tˆh l≠  
and an individual firm has an incentive to hire both domestic and illegal workers such 
that )ˆ0, Th l∈  . 
The expected punishment cost of hiring an illegal migrant is denoted by pZ . The 
parameter ( )Z w>  is the punishment cost, or the employer sanction measured in 
monetary units, and p  is the probability of being caught for hiring illegal migrants. 
The probability p  depends on a given level of vigilance v , such that [ ]0,v v∈ , and 
the number of illegal migrants per unit of output h  (hired by an individual firm). 
Here, v  is the highest level of vigilance. Let us consider ( ) ( )1p v hα φ α = + −    . 
Here, α  is the indicator parameter and p  satisfies the following assumption: 
Assumption 1 
A. [ )
ˆ1 if  0,  and  ,
ˆ0 if    or and  .
T
T
v v h l
v v h l
α
 ∈ <= 
= =
 
B. ( )0 1v hφ≤ ≤ ; and [ ]0,v v∀ ∈  the following is true: ( ) 0v vφ′ > .  
 
 
5Though the limitations of linear technology are known, this assumption can be justified by the historical 
evidence, at least in English agricultural production as found by [17]. Furthermore, this assumption also im-
plies that domestic workers and illegal immigrants are perfect substitutes for each other. 
6Alternatively, one can think that θ  represents the level of exploitation of an illegal worker of an industry 
i.e. an industry with high moral has high value of θ  hence less exploitation and vice versa. Each individual 
firm in that industry operates with this industry's level of θ  because of competition. 
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C. 0h∀ > , ( ) 0v hφ →  as 0v → ; and 0v∀ > , ( ) 0v hφ →  as 0h → .  
Assumption 1 implies that an individual firm’s probability of being caught for hiring 
illegal immigrants depends on both the level of vigilance and the number of illegal 
immigrants hired. One might argue that both the type and number of illegal 
immigrants affect the probability of being caught. If the illegal immigrant is from the 
same ethnic group as the domestic worker, it is easier to blend into the workforce. On 
the other hand, if the illegal migrant looks different, it is much harder to blend in. For a 
given level of vigilance, the probability of being caught would be greater for the latter 
group than the former. The indicator parameter α  incorporates this. If an individual 
firm hires all illegal immigrants from different ethnic backgrounds (i.e. Tˆh l= ) then 
probability of getting caught is 1 i.e. 1p = . The probability of getting caught is also 1 if 
government chooses the highest level of vigilance ie v v= . 
Firm i s′  unit cost of hiring an illegal migrant, denoted by hic , is as follows:  
( ) .hic w v hZθ φ= +                           (3) 
An individual firm has an incentive to hire illegal immigrant if the following 
condition is met7:  
( )
( )
*1h d
i i
w
c c h h
v Z
θ
φ
−
≤ ⇒ ≤ ≡                       (4) 
One of the implications of Equation (4) is as follows: for any given 0v > , the cost of 
hiring labour for producing one unit of output will be as follows8:  
( )
*
* *
ˆ ˆˆ for  ,
ˆ ˆˆ 1 for  .
d
T T T
i dh
T T T
c wl l h
c
c w l h l hθ
 = ≤=   = − − >  
 
Indeed, the above expression reveals that there exists a non-monotonic relationship 
between the increased vigilance level and domestic job creations. Note that, If an 
individual firm chooses not to hire illegal migrants then the unit cost of hiring labour 
will be 0 ˆˆi Tc c wl= = . 
Structure of the Game: In this game, an individual firm’s decision is taken in two 
stages: 
Stage 1: In this stage, an individual firm will decide whether to hire illegal 
immigrants.  
Stage 2: An individual firm will then choose its output level iq , i.e., each firm is 
engaging in Cournot-Nash Competition.  
The above game can be solved by backward induction. One can easily solve Stage 2 of 
this game. Since each firm is facing Cournot-Nash Competition, one obtains the 
following standard Cournot results by using Equation (1):  
 
 
7Note that the total cost minimization problem of hiring labour per unit of output will be as follows: 
{ } ( )
( )
( )
**1ˆ ˆmin
2Th
w
w v h h l h w h h
v Z
θ
θ φ
φ
− = + + − ⇒ = ≡     . However, an individual firm finds it profitable to 
hire more illegal immigrants h  as long as any *h h≤ . Since ** *hˆ h< , the only binding condition will be 
*h . 
8For more details, please see [18]. 
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( ) [ ] ( )
( ) [ ] ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2* * *
1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2
2* * *
2 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2
* * *
1 1 2 2 1 2
2 2* * * *
1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2
2 2* *
1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2
1
1, 2   and  ,
3
1, 2   and  ,
3
, ,
1, , , , ,
2
, , ,
q c c A c c q c c
q c c A c c q c c
P A q c c q c c
CS c c q c c q c c q c c q c c
PS c c q c c q c c
W c
 = − + Π =  
 = − + Π =  
= − −
   = + +   
   = +   
( ) ( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2 2* * * *
2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2
2* *
1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2
3, , , , ,
2
, , ,
c q c c q c c q c c q c c
W c c c c q c c c c q c c c c
   = + +   
 = = = + = 
    (5) 
where the “*” signifies the equilibrium values and CS , PS  and W  stand for 
consumer surplus, producer surplus and welfare, respectively, W CS PS= +  at 
equilibrium. 
An individual firm i  will find that hiring illegal immigrants reduces the value of ic  
because they are paid less than the domestic workers9. In this case, solving Stage 1 of 
this game, involves a Nash equilibrium where each firm hires illegal migrants. However, 
in the presence of interior vigilance level v , the above result may not hold. Therefore, 
one needs to characterize the role of v  in determining the value of ic . This is crucial 
not only for solving the Stage 1 of our game, but also to the understanding of how firms 
behave when they are hiring illegal immigrants. Indeed, Nabin and Sgro (2013) have 
developed the following Lemma : 
Lemma 1. For any given technology such that *Tˆl h∀ > , an individual firm finds the 
strategy of hiring illegal immigrants profitable at equilibrium and such a strategy is also 
dominant over the strategy of not hiring illegal immigrants. However, if *Tˆl h≤  then 
no individual firm is hiring illegal immigrants.  
Proof. See Nabin and Sgro (2013) for proof [18].  
For given technology T  and *Tˆl h∀ > , one can also derive the total demand for 
illegal immigrants which is as follows:  
( )* * * *2 ˆ 1
3
h
d TE h Q h A l h θ = = − + −   
where *h  is the demand for an illegal immigrant to produce one unit of output, and 
*Q  is the aggregate level of output of a given industry.  
3. Analysis  
3.1. Welfare Analysis  
Conditions for an individual firm hiring both domestic workers and illegal immigrants, 
or hiring only domestic workers have been derived (i.e. Lemma 2). To complete our 
analysis we need to analyze the welfare of an industry when an individual firm has an 
incentive to hire illegal immigrants for a given technology. Without loss of generality 
and to keep our analysis simple, we normalize 1w = , this also implies that 1Z >  
(this follows from our earlier discussion). 
 
 
9Illegal immigrants have less market power because of their illegal status. 
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This section considers two welfare criteria to analyze the welfare of an industry. Our 
concern is not about social welfare both the effects on certain industries with 
imperfectly competitive market structures. 
Criterion 1: This criterion simply considers Marshallian surplus to examine the 
welfare of the given industry. For a given technology T , if no one hires illegal immi- 
grants, the total surplus will be as follows (from Equation (5)):  
2
0
4 ˆ
9
T
TW A l = −                            (6) 
Similarly, for given technology T , if an individual firm hires illegal immigrants, the 
total surplus will be as follows:  
( )
2* *
2 *
4 ˆ ˆ1
9
4 ˆ ˆ                   
9
T T
T
h
T T
A l h l h
W
A l l h
θ  − + − ∀ >  = 
  − ∀ ≤ 
                 (7) 
Criterion 2: Our second criterion emphasizes the employment level of domestic 
workers. For given technology T , if no one hires illegal migrants, total employment 
for domestic unskilled workers, in this particular industry, will be as follows (from 
Equation (5)):  
2
*
0
1
2ˆ ˆ ˆ
3
T
T i T T
i
E l q l A l
=
 = = − ∑                        (8) 
Similarly, for given technology T , if an individual firm hires illegal migrants, total 
employment for domestic unskilled workers, in this particular industry, will be as 
follows :  
( ) ( )* * *
*
2ˆ ˆ ˆ1 ,
3
2ˆ ˆ ˆ,                              
3
T T T
T
h
T T T
l h A l h l h
E
l A l l h
θ  − − + − ∀ >  = 
  − ∀ ≤ 
              (9) 
By using the Equations (6), (7), (8) and (9), we develop the following proposition:  
Proposition 1. ( ]0,1θ∀ ∈ , the following will be true for a given industry: 
A. Given technology Tˆl  such that if 
*
Tˆl h> , then hiring illegal migrants is welfare 
enhancing as 0
T T
hW W≥ .  
B. (i) *Tˆl h∀ >  and 
( )
( )
ˆ2 1ˆ T
T
l v Z
l A
v Z
φ
φ
−
< ≤ , *θ∃  such that *θ θ<  then 0
T T
hE E≥  
and if *θ θ>  then 0
T T
hE E< . 
(ii) However, *Tˆl h∀ >  and 
( )
( )
ˆ2 1Tl v ZA
v Z
φ
φ
−
> , then 0
T T
hE E< .  
C. If *Tˆl h≤  then 0
T T
hW W=  and 0
T T
hE E=  will be true. 
Proof. Please see the Appendix. 
The above proposition tells us that, contrary to conventional wisdom, hiring illegal 
immigrants is not necessarily detrimental to welfare or domestic job creation for 
domestic workers in a given industry. Figure 1 illustrates Propositions 1 A and 1 B(i) 
for the parameter values 0.59A = , ˆ 0.5Tl = , ( ) 3v Zφ =  and [ ]0,1θ∀ ∈ . In Figure 
1, (a) illustrates the welfare of an economy, whereas (b) illustrates the domestic job 
creation in a given industry. Clearly, when 0.8θ <  and each firm is hiring illegal 
M. H. Nabin, P. M. Sgro 
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(a)                                         (b) 
Figure 1. (a) Welfare of an industry and (b) Domestic Job Creation. 
 
immigrants, employment opportunities for domestic workers are higher than when no 
firm hires illegal immigrants. Given the production technology, for a lower value of θ , 
a firm is able to hire more illegal immigrants only by hiring more domestic workers. 
This follows from the non-monotonic unit cost of production. The fact is that, in the 
presence of vigilance and employer sanction and for any θ  such that 1θ < , both 
illegal workers and domestic workers become complementary factors10. Therefore, it is 
interesting to analyze the role of vigilance level and firms’ hiring behaviour regarding 
domestic workers. 
Our result is consistent with the earlier empirical findings of [19] where they used 
the Leontief production function to estimate the effect of illegal Mexican immigrants 
on native workers. 
3.2. Optimal Vigilance Level  
To understand the effect of an increased vigilance level on employment opportunities 
of native workers, we rewrite Equation (9) as follows:  
( )* * * * *2ˆ ˆ ˆ  where    and  1
3
T d d
h T TE a Q l h a l h Q A l h θ = ∀ > = − = − + −     (10) 
By differentiating Equation (10) with respect to v  we get:  
( )( )
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
, , ,
divide both side by 
          follows from Equation 10
T d
h
T d
dh
T d
dh
T T T T
h h h h
T d
h
T d
h
E v a v Q v
E a QQ a
v v v
E v a v Q v vQ a
v E v E v E E
E v a v Q v
v E v a v Q
η η η
∆ ∆ ∆
= +
∆ ∆ ∆
 ∆ ⋅ ∆ ⋅ ∆ ⋅
⇒ = +  
∆ ⋅ ∆ ⋅ ∆ ⋅  
∆ ⋅ ∆ ⋅ ∆ ⋅
⇒ = +
∆ ⋅ ∆ ⋅ ∆ ⋅
⇒ = −
   (11) 
 
 
10Note that *T dhE a Q= , where *ˆda l h= −  and ( )* *
2 ˆ 1
3 T
Q A l h θ = − + −  . A lower value of θ  will in-
crease *Q  but reduce da  and, if the effect of an increased *Q  is dominant over the effect of reduced da , 
it will lead to an outcome where more jobs are created for native workers. 
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Here, 
,Th
T
h
TE v
h
E v
v E
η
∆ ⋅
=
∆ ⋅
, 
,
0d
d
da v
a v
v a
η ∆ ⋅= >
∆ ⋅
 and *
*
*,
0
Q v
Q v
v Q
η ∆ ⋅= <
∆ ⋅
. 
Equation (11) helps us to develop the following proposition:  
Proposition 2. For given technology T  and *Tˆl h∀ > , the following will be true:  
A. If *, ,da v Q vη η>  then , 0ThE vη > .  
B. If *, ,da v Q vη η=  then , 0ThE vη = .  
C. If *, ,da v Q vη η<  then , 0ThE vη < .  
Proof. The proof mainly follows from Equation (11).  
Proposition 2 states that an increase in the vigilance level will not necessarily lead to 
an increase in employment opportunities for native workers. Indeed, there is a non- 
monotonic relationship between the vigilance level and employment of native workers. 
An increase in the vigilance level has two effects: (i) it will reduce the value of *h , and 
increase the value of da . This occurs because an increase in the vigilance level will 
increase the cost of hiring illegal migrants to produce one unit of output, hence a firm 
has less incentive to hire illegal immigrants; and (ii) it will reduce the aggregate output 
level, *Q . Since total employment for native workers is also proportional to aggregate 
output level, it will also fall. Clearly, these two effects are moving in opposite directions. 
Therefore, the total employment opportunities for native workers due to increased 
vigilance, depend on which effect will dominate. Indeed, Proposition 2 explains this in 
terms of the elasticities of total employment (for native workers), ThE , 
da  and 
aggregate output level *Q  with respect to v . Figure 2 illustrates these two effects 
more clearly. 
 
 
Figure 2. Employment opportunities for native workers and vigilance level. 
M. H. Nabin, P. M. Sgro 
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Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between the vigilance level v  and employment 
for native workers ThE  using a four quadrants diagram. The fourth quadrant illustrates 
the negative relationship between v  and *h  (from condition (4)), the first and 
second quadrants illustrate the positive relationship between: (i) *h  and *Q  (from 
Equation (10)) (ii) *Q  and ThE  (from Equation (10)) respectively. Finally, the third 
quadrant illustrates the non-monotonic relationship between ThE  and v  (from 
Proposition 2). For a given level of vigilance level 1v , the corresponding 
*h  will be 
*
1h  as shown in the fourth quadrant. Thus 
*
1h  will lead us to output level 
*
1Q , which 
is shown in the first quadrant. Given da , this *1Q  leads us to employment level 1
TE  
shown in the second quadrant. In the third quadrant, 1
TE  translates to vigilance level 
1v  which is shown as a . Suppose 1v  increases to 2v , as a result 
*
1h  falls to 
*
2h  
(shown in the fourth quadrant) which eventually reduces aggregate output level *1Q  to 
*
2Q  (shown in the first quadrant). Furthermore, a decrease in 
*h  from *1h  to 
*
2h
--will also increase the value of da  to either 1
da  or 2
da  or 3
da  (shown in the second 
quadrant) and this effect, along with falling output level, will lead to either a decrease in 
total employment to 2
TE , or no change in 1
TE  or an increase in total employment 
3
TE  (from Proposition 2)11. 
The crucial point of the above diagram is that an increase in the vigilance level will 
not necessarily increase the total employment of native workers. Indeed, it might 
reduce the total employment for native workers because of the non-monotonic 
relationship between the vigilance level and the employment level for native workers 
(from our Proposition 2). The non-monotonic relationship also raises the possibility of 
the existence of *v  such that it will maximize the employment opportunities for native 
workers. The following equation confirms this:  
*
* *
, ,
max dT dh a v Q vv E a Q v η η= ⋅ ⇒ ⇔ =               (12) 
The condition (12) leads to the following proposition: 
Lemma 2. Multiple solutions for *v  are possible. The following summarizes the 
result12:  
A. There exists a corner solution where *v v= .  
B. ( )0,1θ∀ ∈  and ( )( )
22 1ˆ ˆ ˆ2T T Tl A l lv Z
θ
θ
φ
 −
 < < − +
 
 
, there also exists an interior 
solution for *v  such that ( )
( )
2
* 1 **2 1
ˆ 2T
w
v v v
Z l A
θ
φ
θ
−
 − = ≡ <
  − −  
.  
Proof. Please see the Appendix  
The above Lemma implies that if an individual social planner has an objective to 
maximize job opportunities for native workers then either she can choose v  or **v , 
 
 
11Our findings are consistent with the empirical evidence of [20] and the simulation work of [21] where they 
find that hiring more illegal immigrants may lead to more domestic job creations. 
12We assume that inverse of ( )vφ  exists and these multiple solutions must satisfy the second order condi-
tion ( )( )0,1θ∀ ∈ : 
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
2 22
2 2 22
2 1 2 1 1d
2 0,
d 3
which is true as long as 0  or  0  holds.
T
h vE v v v
v v Z v Z v Z
v v v
θ φ θ θ
φ θ φ φ
φ ϕ φ
φ φ φ
 ′− − −
 ′ ′ ′′= − + − − <
            
′′ ′ ′′≤ − >
. 
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where the former is the vigilance level for zero tolerance of illegal migrants and the 
latter the vigilance level that allows some illegal migrants. However, the vigilance level 
**v  is Pareto dominant over v . Even though both levels of vigilance maximize the job 
opportunities for native workers, it is the latter which gives us relatively more welfare 
(from Proposition 1 A). Thus our model suggests that there exists two sets of policies 
regarding the optimal vigilance level and these are { }1 , LK v W=  and { }**2 , HK v W= ; 
where **v v>  and L HW W< ; and 2K  is Pareto dominant over 1K . 
4. Conclusion  
In this paper a Ricardian model has been used to examine the effects of illegal 
immigrants on firms in a Cournot Oligopoly model. A game theory framework has 
been used and internal vigilance has been analyzed as a policy to curb illegal immi- 
grants. We have provided additional insights as to why firms hire illegal workers and 
what motivates these firms in their hiring practices. Furthermore, we have demon- 
strated that multiple solutions exist for the optimal level of vigilance. There exists a 
vigilance level with non-zero tolerance of illegal immigrants which is as effective, in 
creating industry employment opportunities for native workers, as the vigilance level 
with zero tolerance of illegal immigration. Finally, we have introduced a voting model 
to show which level of vigilance will be chosen. 
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Appendix  
Proof of Proposition 1 
(A) If *Tˆl h>  then from Equations (6) and (7), one can show that 0
T T
hW W≥  as 
long as ( )* 1 0h θ− ≥ , which is true for all ( ]0,1θ ∈ . (B) From Equations (8) and (9) 
one can calculate 0
T T
hE E E∆ = − . By putting 0E∆ = , one can solve for θ  and the  
solution is: { } ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )21 1ˆ ˆ ˆ1 , 1 4 42 2T T Tl v Z l v Z l v Z A v Zθ φ φ φ φ
 
= − + + − 
 
. Since 
( ) ( )1
d 2 ˆ 0
d 3 T
E A l
v Zθθ φ=
∆
= − > , this implies that at 1θ = , E∆  cuts the horizontal axis  
from below. Therefore, at other feasible solutions of θ , E∆  must cut the horizontal 
axis from above. Then denote this θ  as *θ . This implies that for any θ  such that 
*θ θ< , 00
T T
hE E E∆ > ⇒ > . For feasibility of such  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )2* 1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ1 4 42 2T T Tl v Z l v Z l v Z A v Zθ φ φ φ φ= − + + − , it must lie between 0  
and 1 .  This gives us the condition: ( )
( )
ˆ2 1ˆ T
T
l v Z
l A
v Z
φ
φ
−
< ≤ .  Therefore,  if 
( )
( )
ˆ2 1Tl v ZA
v Z
φ
φ
−
> , then the only feasible solution for θ  will be 1 . Since E∆  cuts the  
horizontal axis from below at 1θ = , therefore, in this case 00
T T
hE E E∆ < ⇒ < . (C) 
This proof follows mainly from Lemma 2. Lemma 2 states that no firm will hire illegal 
migrants if *Tˆl h≤ . Therefore, in the presence of illegal migrants, 0
T T
hW W=  and 
0
T T
hE E= . 
Proof of Lemma 2  
(A) From condition (12) and with the help of Equation (10), one can explicitly solve 
for *v , which is as follows:  
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
2 2
* * 12 1 2 1
ˆ ˆ2 2T T
w
v v
Z l A Z l A
θ θ
φ φ
θ θ
−
 − − = ⇒ =
    − − − −    
       (13) 
For feasibility of *v , we need the condition *0 hv v< <  be satisfied. This requires 
1θ <  (which is true by our assumption), ˆ ˆ ˆ2T T Tl A l lθ< < −  and  
( )
( )
22 1ˆ ˆ ˆ2T T Tl A l lv Z
θ
θ
φ
 −
 < < − +
 
 
. Here, the binding condition is  
( )
( )
22 1ˆ ˆ ˆ2T T Tl A l lv Z
θ
θ
φ
 −
 < < − +
 
 
. 
(B) Assumption 1 tells us that if v v=  then 1p = . This implies that if v v=  then 
* 0h = . If so then v v=  implies that *, , 0da v Q vη η= =  (follows from Equation (10)). 
Therefore, *v v=  satisfies condition 12. 
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